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THE PURPOSE OF DEATH:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR DWORKIN
ALEXANDER

MORGAN CAPRONt

"But men may construe things after their [own] fashion,
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves."
William Shakespeare*
The recent transplantation at the Stanford Medical Center of the
heart and kidneys of a victim of an armed assault has served to emphasize again the need for a new definition of death which would permit
an authoritative determination whether a person whose brain functions
are permanently destroyed is dead or alive. Dr. Leon Kass and I have
proposed a model statute' which attempts to set to rest the uncertainties
for the criminal and civil law both in unusual situations such as that of
the California homicide organ donor, and in the far more common, but
no less troubling, situation in which the "vital signs" of a comatose patient
are supported for some time and the question arises, "Is he dead ?"
Professor Roger Dworkin argues that all such efforts to define death
are misguided in failing to ask the purpose for which the definition is
sought.2 I might have replied simply that the primary concerns behind
our attempt to provide a new definition of death, centering on the dilemmas brought on by modem medical techniques, were obvious enough as
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
* JULIUS CAEsAR I, iii, 34.

1. A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician,
based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In
the event that artificial means of support preclude a determination that these
functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the announced
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he
has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions.
Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased.
Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human
Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 111 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Capron & Kass].
2. Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623, 628 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Dworkin]. I was puzzled, and made a little uncomfortable, by the way that Professor Dworkin lumps the article by Dr. Kass and myself into what he calls the definition of death literature. Quoting from others, he ascribes to this group certain views
which I not only do not share but was at some pains to disavow in the original article.
Foremost among these is the premise that the law must "define death in a manner acceptable to physicians." Id. at 624. It is also erroneous, as Professor Dworkin recognizes at another point, to pretend to be speaking of our article when observing that
"they agree that organ transplantation is a 'good." Id. at 625. Our proposal was based
on no such premise.
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not to require expatiation. I believe, however, that Professor Dworkin's
presentation provides a useful opportunity to suggest the error in adhering rigidly to the usual, lawyerly, purpose-oriented analysis. Moreover,
there is a danger that many who read Professor Dworkin's article will
not have read the original and may thus be misled by the largely semantic
distinctions he draws. For these reasons, then, I offer this brief analysis
of two central "fallacies" in Professor Dworkin's argument and a restatement of what seem to me the real points at issue-on which I cannot help
but think Professor Dworkin and I are in basic agreement, whatever
he may say to the contrary.
THE FALLACY OF OVEREXTENSION

Professor Dworkin sums up his criticism of the "death definition
literature" by stating that it has failed to address the basic question:
"What difference does it make whether somebody is dead?"' He then
suggests that one answer to this question is that it makes no difference
at all. Unfortunately, his analysis is based on what may be called the
fallacy of overextension.
This fallacy is illustrated by Professor Dworkin's discussion of the
punishment of life-threatening behavior. Most people agree, he writes,
that someone who intentionally tries to kill another ought to be punished
very severely for any of a number of reasons. From this premise, he
argues that since none of these reasons is affected by whether the victim
dies, "his fortuitous survival ought in no way affect the degree of punishment inflicted on his attacker."4 This is an interesting argument about
criminal jurisprudence, but it is irrelevant to the task of defining death.
Professor Dworkin may be right in his disagreement with the drafters
of the Model Penal Code,' but the question he is debating is whether
the deterrent and punitive purposes of the criminal law are well or illserved by distinguishing between murder and attempted murder. The
fallacy lies in trying to extend whatever purposes the criminal law may
have in selecting certain conduct for severe sanctions into a discussion
of the definition of death. Professor Dworkin cannot possibly mean to
suggest that the purposes of the criminal law require that all victims
of homicidal attacks be declared "dead" so that their assailants may be
prosecuted for murder. Rather, were a legislature convinced by Professor Dworkin's views on substantive criminal law, it should punish alike
all intentional efforts to take human life whether they cause death or not.
3.

Id. at 629.

4. Id. at 631.

5. Id.

642

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
THE FALLACY OF THE PRESUMPTUOUS PRESUMPTION

Professor Dworkin's second argument involves his view that the
law sometimes refers to such factors as the length of time that a person
has been absent from home without tidings to define death.' Since such
a standard for determining death is not included in the definition that
Dr. Kass and I proposed, Professor Dworkin concludes that we ignored
"the fact that the law has long recognized that death occurs at different
times for diffenent purposes." 7 Of course, we did no such thing. Professor Dworkin is guilty of employing the fallacy of the presumptuous
presumption.
A society, in order to take account of the alienation of affections and
to permit the alienation of property, must establish certain rules for determining such matters as when a person is legally married and when property passes to heirs. For reasons which seem too obvious to elaborate,
our society has traditionally chosen to regard death as one of the major
nonvolitional determiners of a person's status and also of the status and
rights of his family and property. Because of a recognition that other
events besides a person's death may be appropriate occasions for the liberation of spouse and estate, the law provides that in certain circumstances,
such as undue absence, spouses may remarry, property may be distributed, and the like.' The law seeks to protect both the interests of the
absentee and those of his or her relatives and friends.
Even so, some states go to elaborate lengths to safeguard the rights
of the absentee by providing for delay before property is actually distributed, and for an additional period during which persons to whom property is distributed must post bonds to assure its return should the
absentee reappear.9 In most jurisdictions, judicial orders may even
be overturned if the "dead" person reappears at any time.1"
Plainly, then, what is involved in such "definitions" is only a pre6. Id. at 633-36.
7. Id. at 633.
8. The law in Pennsylvania is illustrative. A trustee may be appointed for a
person who is "absent from his last known place of residence for a period of one
year without being heard of after diligent inquiry" upon petition of a person interested
in the absentee's property, to conserve that property and enter into certain sales with
court approval and under bond. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5702 (1972). During the
trusteeship, the court may after proper notice, id. § 5704, make a finding that the
absent person is dead, based on particular facts or on the presumption which arises
from seven years "unexplained absence." Id. § 5701. See also C-.. PROD. CODE §§
260-272 (West 1972).
9. See, e.g., CAL. PROD. CODE §§ 285-94 (West 1956).
10. See, e.g., O~io Rv. CODE ANN. § 2121.09 (Page 1968) ("on satisfactory
proof that a presumed decedent is in fact alive"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5703
(1972) ("if it shall later be established that the absentee was in fact alive at the time
of distribution"). See also Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 47-50 (1894).
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sumption. It might be objected that a physician's declaration that a
body is dead is also only a presumption based on his opportunity to inspect
the body, his skill in doing so, and on certain probabilities which enter
into the conclusions he draws from his observations. However, the type
of "presumptions" involved in definitions of death, such as the CapronKass proposal, relate to physical observations about apparent corpses, and
are not presumptions resorted to only because the circumstances preclude
such observations.
The presumptions which Professor Dworkin cites have only limited
effect. For example, one may not with impunity murder a person whose
absence from home for seven years has led to the presumption that he
is "dead" for such purposes as distributing property. 1 In brief, they are
presumptions about property rights or family status and not definitions
of death at all. 2
THE PURPOSE OF DEFINING DEATH

Professor Dworkin objects to the thrust of such an argument, however, because he believes it overlooks the question of purpose. It seems
to me that he would have us treat death as something freely to be definea
after our own fashion, as the Bard writes, "clean from the purpose of
the thing [itself].""

We define death in an attempt to arrive at an agreed upon standard
for describing a phenomenon which we think we observe in the life cycle
of all beings. Of course, the definition can no more be "clean" of the
cultural context in which it will operate than it is of the thing itself. However, the uses to which the status of being dead may be put need not
fashion the definition of death.
Professor Dworkin has asked the wrong question. Rather than asking the purpose for which we are defining death, we must ask what
use the law should make of a "definition of death" which has been
framed not as a legal fiction, but as a reflection of social and biological
reality. There are several legal consequences which traditionally have
flowed from the status of "death" and there is fevery reason to believe
that most or all of these will continue to apply. 4 Society may, however,
11. Cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 80 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
12. Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 469-71 (1905) ; Il re Crater's
Estate, 171 Misc. 732, 733, 13 N.Y.S.2d 597, 598 (Sur. Ct. 1939) (presumption "is
an arbitrary one rendered necessary upon grounds of public policy in order that rights
depending upon the life of one long absent and unheard of may be settled.").
13. W. SHIAXESPEAIE, JUiIUS CAESAR I, iii, 34.
14. Examples are provided in Dworkin, mipra note 2, at 629. It may seem odd

to Professor Dworkin that "all these different situations [are] susceptible to resolution by one definition of death," but while it is recognized that statutory and

common law rules on this as other matters are subject to change it is perhaps note-
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decide that another status besides "death" should be used in certain circumstances to trigger the consequences which normally follow upon a
determination of death.'" For example, Professor Dworkin's argument
about the law of attempted murder suggests that the victim's status as
an object of a life-threatiening act should be substituted for death as one
of the elements of a "homicide" conviction." Dr. Kass and I made a
similar suggestion concerning organ transplantation. Since it is important for transplantation purposes to obtain organs before they have
deteriorated, we recognized that the demand for viable organs may
exceed the supply made available under our standards for determining
whether death has occurred. If society wishes to encourage organ transplantation, we argued that it should do so directly by adopting standards
for determining when a donor's organs may be removed although he is
not dead.' Standards might vary depending upon such factors as the
urgency of the recipient's need and on whether the donation was at the
donor's prompting or that of his relatives after he became comatose.
Substantive and procedural safeguards against overreaching, bias or
conflicts of interest on the part of physicians would probably also be
advisable as part of a law establishing the status of "organ donor." The
unneoessity of such safeguards in the ordinary circumstances where
death is pronounced is an indication of why it is preferable to describe
"organ donor" status as a separate category from which certain consequenoes flow.'" The issue should not be confused by saving that it is
worthy that our society has found it acceptable to employ a single concept of the end
of human life in all these contexts.
15. Let us suppose, for example, that at the moment the law permits lifesupporting treatment of comatose patients to be ended only when they have died. The
status of suffering from permanent loss of higher brain faculties might be substituted
for the status of being "dead" in those circumstances. As Professor Dworkin suggests
this could amount to an attempt to solve the difficult issue of euthanasia by the definitional route. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 637. It is exactly for this reason, however,
that Dr. Kass and I argue that one must keep separate the questions "when is a
person dead?" and "when should he be allowed to die?" Capron & Kass, supra note 1,
at 105. I thus agree with Professor D)workin that a state may wish to provide for
devolution of an estate when a person's "chance of a return to health, productivity or
even consciousness was . . . slight," without removing the penalties for homicide if
his heart were removed by a physician or other murderer. Dworkin, Msipra note 2, at
632. Nevertheless, the clearest way to achieve the state's ends would not be to call

the person dead when his prognosis is very bad but to establish a procedure for distribution of property prior to death, thereby preserving all the other expectations about
his treatment as a nondead person.
16. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 631.
17. Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 107-08.
18. If the legislature wanted instead to discourage or even prohibit organ transplantation, the simplest and surest thing to do would be to place limits on the surgical
procedures themselves. To do it as Professor Dworkin proposes, see Dworkin, supra
note 2, at 638, by monkeying around with the "definition of death," would not only
be inefficient but would spawn confusion and probably be unenforceable as well.
19. Cf. Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1911) (statute assures adequate notice
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another definition of death.
Similar considerations led us to separate the questions of when a
person is dead and when a person should be allowed to die. " The growing
ability of medical science to prolong the process of dying by means of
"heroic" and expensive treatment (some of which is also painful and dehumanizing) creates concern that standards must be established to determine when treatment for a dying patient may be ended. Societal permission for the practice of euthanasia 2 ' and, of course, the actual decision to
undertake it in an individual case would require careful but painful deliberation. While the need for such deliberation cannot be overcome by
the formulation of a definition alone, it can make the decision to cease
treatment less agonizing in those cases in which it is found that the
patient is dead. Furthermore, a failure to draw any line between
the dead and the dying is an invitation either to incredible abuse or to
paralysis.22
Since he provides no indications that his approach to legislative
drafting is ever actually employed, Professor Dworkin's alternative to the
Capron-Kass statute is at least novel. Rather than first establishing a
single definition of death, and then employing the term "death" in other
statutes concerning marriage, property, contracts, homicide, etc., Professor Dworkin proposed that all such statutes include separate clauses
(such as "when said person's heartbeat and respiration cease") to define
death.2" It is hard to see what would be gained by this unique approach
to legislation. 21 More practically still, Professor Dworkin fails to adduce any evidence that "special purpose" definitions (as opposed to presumptions) have been urged in any area besides organ transplantation.
It is good that Professor Dworkin has presented the traditional
and other safeguards); Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 476-77 (1905)

(statute
which is
20.
21.
drawing

provides essential safeguards for protection of the property of the absentee
to be administered).
Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 105.
For purposes of this discussion, no distinction need be drawn between withnecessary treatment from dying patients (negative euthanasia) and admin-

istering a substance which brings life to a quick and painless end (positive euthanasia).

22. If death is "totally beyond our ken," Dworkin, supra note 2, at 638, how
can we decide whom to treat or whom to bury, etc.?
23. Id.
24 If Professor Dworkin were right about legislative drafting, then the statutes
on the presumptive death of absentees, see id. at 633-36, would speak only in terms of
criteria (length of absence, no tidings, circumstances of disappearance, etc.) and would
not use terms like "as if dead." They do, however, all use such terms. Although these
statutes do not, as was emphasized above, "define death" but only establish rules for
distribution of estates, etc., their draftsmen clearly found it useful (as common law
judges had) to refer to death analogically, to help orient decisionmakers to the statute's
commands.
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lawyer's approach of analyzing purpose. I believe, however, that the task
of defining death simply cannot be tied to such a procrustean bed. The
purposes for which a definition will be used, beginning with medical
decisionmaking and continuing through the whole list of consequences
which the law has traditionally had follow upon death,2" are not the difficult points at issue. The real challenge, which Dr. Kass and I tried to
meet, is for the present-day legal definition to take into account the realities, and the dilemmas, of modern medicine. We proposed that neurological standards have a place in a modern restatement of the traditional
understanding of death."8 I continue to believe that there should be a
"robust and well-informed public debate"2 over whether neurological
factors should play a greater or lesser role in a statutory definition. I also
remain of the opinion that it is well for a statute to leave
for future resolution the even more difficult problems concerning the conditions and procedures under which a decision
may be reached to cease treating a terminal patient who does not
meet the standards set forth in the statutory "definition of
'
death. 28
If the public and its representatives were to tackle these difficult tasks, I
seriously doubt that the questions at issue between Professor Dworkin
and myself would or ought to be of more than academic concern.
25. See note 14 supra & text accompanying.
26. It has long been known that, even when a patient loses consciousness and
becomes areflexive, he may recover if heartbeat and breathing continue, but if
they do not there is no hope of recovery. Thus, death came to be equated with
the absence of these two "vital signs," although what was being detected was
really the permanent cessation of the integrated functioning of the circulatory,
respiratory, and nervous systems. In recent years, the traditional concept of
death has been departed from, or at least severely strained, in the case of persons who were dead according to the rationale underlying the traditional standards in that they had experienced a period of anoxia long enough to destroy
their brain functions, but in whom respiration and circulation were artificially
re-created. By recognizing that such artificial means of support may preclude
reliance on the traditional standards of circulation and respiration, the statute
proposed here merely permits the logic behind the long-existing understanding
(i.e., integrated trisystemic functioning) to be served; it does not create any
"new" type of death. Practically, of course, it accomplishes this end by articulating the "new" standard of "irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions," as another means of measuring the existing understanding.
Capron & Kass, supra note 1, at 112, n.89.
27. Id. at 118.
28. Id.
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